RELIGIONS AND MEDIATION, PART SIX

In previous postings I discussed various religious traditions and how they intersect with mediation. The subject of this final posting regarding this topic is Confucianism.

The Chinese scholar K’ung-Fu-tzu (Jesuits later Latinized as Confucius), 550-478 BCE lived in a time when China’s feudal system was collapsing. Confucius proposed an ethical-moral system intended to govern all relationships in the family, community and state by emphasizing characteristics such as virtue, selflessness, duty, patriotism, hard work and respect for hierarchy. Confucian values the maintenance of group harmony over the rights of the individual.

When harmony is disturbed, it is best restored through compromise. Confucian ethic teaches that it is better “to suffer a little” and restore harmony rather than continue dissension.

Confucianism also places emphasis on preserving status differences in society. While modern Western societies stress democratic individual rights, traditional Confucianism recognizes the importance of understanding the exact social setting of a dispute and search for solutions consistent with all parties social roles and their past and future relationships.

In Confucian societies there is historically less use of magistrates and courts. Such procedures were expensive, time consuming, unpredictable in outcomes and considered degrading, as such forums required public admission of some failing. Having a dispute in law course was usually considered disreputable.

In recent years, China has seen more than two hundred thousand “people’s mediation committees,” which deal with millions of disputes, grow in numbers. Other local groups handle even more such committees. And disputes that do reach courts often get resolved in judicially sponsored compromises.

In modern China, judicial mediation differs from the Western practice of mediation. Judicial mediators are authoritarian and often impose compromises that, consistent with Confucian values, favor group harmony over individual rights.

Several years ago I planned and executed an international conference for Asia Pacific mediators in Penang, Malaysia with counseling psychologist Paul Pedersen. Mediators from many Asian countries shared examples of how they conducted mediations. One case was presented by a judge from China who had handled a copyright dispute between a Japanese firm and a Chinese retailer. As the mediator-judge, he conducted his own investigation of the facts and worked with the parties to secure a compromise settlement which included an admission of wrong-doing and small financial settlement, but most importantly, it included a focus on an apology and forgiveness.

By comparison, we can imagine what the focus would have been in a U.S. court.

Again, I invite corrections to my understanding.

Peter Costanzo
RELIGIONS AND MEDIATION, PART FIVE

In previous postings I discussed Jewish, Christian, Islamic and Buddhist traditions as they relate to mediation. The subject of this posting is indigenous peoples traditions.

Groups of people are described as indigenous when they are the earliest known inhabitants of a region and who maintain the traditions and other aspects of an early culture. Today there are some 5,000 indigenous cultures worldwide totaling around 300 million or about the population of the United States. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples suggests that indigenous peoples have the right to autonomous governing and legal structures.

Of course with distinct cultures, languages, histories and ways of life, there is wide diversity among groups of indigenous peoples. Nonetheless, it is said they share some common values, such as an understanding of the interconnectedness of all living entities.

Indigenous peoples have used alternative dispute resolution to resolve disagreements among their own and with other tribes using procedures to seek group consensus and interconnectedness. For example, Peacemaking Circles, which incorporate family and community members guided by elders, brought disputants, such as accused offenders and victims in face-to-face discussions. The use of the term alternative dispute resolution is not appropriate, however, as these procedures were not “alternatives” to courts or other formal institutions. The dispute resolution processes were truly indigenous. Consider that Pocahontas is alleged to have been the “go-between” (or mediator) for her Algonquian chieftain father Powhatan and the early colonial English settlers.

The 1872 Kitsegukla Incident in Canada provides an interesting contrast in style. White miners had accidentally caused the burning of the village. Local chiefs then blockaded portions of the Skeena River. The groups met to resolve the impasse. For three days the chiefs recounted their grievances that lead to the blockade and told stories and performed songs. This “feast” included storytelling of oral history and accepting of gifts from the British acknowledging wrongdoing and recognizing the chiefs’ jurisdiction ending with signing a mutual agreement. The chiefs did not ask that the miners themselves be, “brought to justice,” as the three-day “feast” made the point allowing healing to occur.

The British negotiators who saw the negotiations as a long, boring, frustrating waste of time, only to eventually pay off the chiefs, failed to appreciate that the “feast” was an attempt to make peace, histories and culture. The chiefs were sharing to learn more about each other and build a new relationship; the British were there to make a payment to end the blockade.

While this is admittedly a broad generalization, indigenous dispute resolution focuses on relationships rather than on outcomes.

As before, I welcome comments to correct my understanding.

Peter Costanzo